High assurance systems have various types of system requirements, most notably safety, real-time, reliability, security and availability. The primary goal o j high assurance system designers is t o integrate various functions of the system while preserving the system consistency with the requirements. I n this paper we show how automated synchronization based on receptive safety rules facilitates this integration. GenEx is a synchronization tool that computes the synchronization conditions n,ecessary for the system components to satisfy their receptive safety requirements, while preservin,g the real-time an,d liveness properties of the syst e m . The complexify of con,current software systems limits the use of formal development and verification techn,iques in industrial applications. GenEx computes the synchronization conditions independently for each receptive safety rule, thus significantly reducing the complexity of the behauior analysis. We show how, us-in,g GenEr synchronization, we designed a controller f o r a medium-sized industrial production, system with safety. liveness and real-time requirements. g e 11 e ratio 12, re li a b dit y .
Introduction
Safety and reliability are some of the most importa.nt properties of high assurance systems. These properties are conceptually simple and can be enforced by proper synchronization of the system components. Automated synchronization techniques are widesprea.d in the hardware CAD. However, the combinatorial explosion of t,he combined state space intrinsic in global analysis makes these approaches impractical for all but the most trivial software systems. Fort,unately. analysis with respect to receptive safety rules can be performed on partial systems and it has been shown that the verified safety is preserved when the parts of the system are composed [l] . In this paper, we describe a method for the integration of concurrent systems using receptive safety rules as in- to compute the component synchronization [7] . Our inethod is embodied in a design tool GenEx that analyzes the beha.vior of the system and modifies its components to produce a reliably safe executable system with respect to t.he given safety rules.
Our method facilitates the automated integration and composition of finite state-based concurrent and distributed systems. We use receptive safety rules [l] to define acceptable partial orders of system actions and synchronize the components to interact correctly with respect to those constraints. Figure 1 shows a high level view of the integration process using our method. Components a.re independently designed finite state machines, produced to perform specific functions. Safety rules describe the unsafe sequences of actions by the components. The beha.vior and in-Figure 2: The Production Cell system teract,ion of the components is andyzed with respect t,o t,he safety rules, deriving synchronization condit,ions for the components from the safety violation preconditions. The process produces modified components that include the necessary synchronization mechanisms to satisfy the given safety rules. This paper shows the use of our method for designing a cont.roller for the production cell system [5] used for a case study of over a dozen formal design methods for concurrent systems. We formally verified the safet,y of the controller, and produced an executable system capable of controlling the production cell.
In section 2 we describe the individua.1 components and the receptive safety rules as finite state machines and we show how the synchronization conditions are used to synchronize the system. Section 3 contains the description of the synchronization and integration process for one safety rule. Section 4 describes the comput,at.ional complexity of the process, and in. section 5 we describe some related work and our future research plans.
Production Cell Controller
The production cell system in Figure 2 is a. medium Complexity indust,ria.l syst'em wit.h safety, reliability a.nd real-time requirements. The system contains five devices t81iat respond to cont,rol direct,ives from a controller a,nd return sensor information on t.heir position. The devices are: 1 a press that processes metal with magnet,s at their ends for loading and unloading t,he press, 3) a feeding belt t81iat brings new met,al blanks, 4) a rotating table where the new blanks are depositmecl to be picked by the robot, and 5) a deposit belt* where the robot deposits the processed blanks to be taken out of the system. A crane between the feeding and deposit belt maintains a conhuous stream blanks. 2) a rota.ting ro 1 ! ot wit.11 two extensible arms of blanks coming into the system for simulation purposes.
The purpose of the controller is to synchronize the machines to tmnsport the blanks, press them and deposit the pressed blanks on t.he deposit helt. This paper shows how this controller can be automatically generated as a composition of controllers for individual devices. Our goal is to use simple controllers for each device and integrate them using safety rules as restrictions on their interaction. The system has two types of safety requirements: 1) mobility restrictions for individual components, and 2) collision and blank loss avoidance requirements that describe safe interactions between system devices. All system safety requirements refer to either a single device or a pair, meaning that t,he interact,ions in this system are decomposable. The decomposability of interaction facilitates the partition of the a.nalysis and integration.
Each device has individual mobility restrictions that specify the extremes of its movement. In the case of the rotating table, the extreme safe elevat,ion corresponds to the positmion required for the robot to pick up the blank. Mobility restrictions are of realtime nature, because the controller has to react and stsop a moving device that reaches an ext,reme position within a predefined time interval (immediately for the rotating table). The safety of the system ca,n be viohted by collisions between two devices or two blanks on t8he same device. It is also a safety violation when a metal blank is released from one device and falls on the floor instead of being placed on another device. These sa.fety violations are time-independent and depend only on the component interaction.
2.1
Components In GenEx, each individual component is defined as a finite state machine (FSM). Figurt: 3 shows the Mealy finite state machine specification of the feed-belt and rotating-table components. The transition labels for the component6 specify their enabling conditions and the resulting changes in the controlled variables. The controlled variables of the component,s are control signals for the respective devices. Every st.ate contains a default transition to itself (not shown) enabled by the negation of enabling conditions for other transitions. The states embody the decisionmaking properties of the components. The components in our system are designed to perform two functions: they specify the finite state sequence of device movements, a.nd they implement the real-time aspect of cont.rol requirements. such as mobility restrictions.
The simplest component of the production cell cont,roller is the feed-belt. The belt is equipped with a sensor that detects when a metal blank reaches the end of t.he belt, and it accepts one controlling signal specifying whet,her to move or stop. The beha.vior of the feed belt is simple: it should move until a blank is det,ected at the end of the belt, then it should stop and restart when the rotat,ing table is ready to receive t,he blank. This behavior is formally defined in Figure 3(a). The graphical notation shows tha.t the belt is stopped as soon as the sensor detects a metal blank. This reaction must be immediate because the moving belt will otherwise unload t8he bla.nk within a predefined amount of time. The transition to state UN-LOA DING is enabled as soon as the feed-belt enters its B L A N l i state, but the state of the rotating-table also determines when this transition c a n be coniplet,ed without, violat,ing system sa.fety.
The rota.t,ing table moves between a position in line wit.11 the feed belt, where the feed belt can unload a blank onto the table, and a dia,gonal position where the metal bla.nk is properly positioned to be picked up by t,he robot. The behavior of the rotating-table component, follows: start, in t,he INLINE st,ate, rotate clockwise and stop in the diagoiml position, then rot,at,e counterclockwise back t,o the inline position. This behavior is defined in Figure 3 (b).
2.2

Receptive Safety Rules
The component. descriptions of the previous section are independent, wit.11 each component. responding only t80 it8s device sensor inputs. The independence between t81ie components siniplifies design and maintenance and prorriotes component reuse for similar systems.
The coinponent,s have t.o be synchronized t.o transfer the meta.1 blmks without dropping them or causing collisions. A blank falls on t8he ground if it is unloaded from t,he feed belt, before tthe table is in it8s inline posit,ion: two blanks collide if a second one arrives on the t,able before the previous one is picked by t,he robot,. The occurrence of t,hese safet,y violat.ions in t,he physi- Figure 3 : Two Independent Device Controllers for the Production Cell System unload a new blank. This informal description of the desired interaction between the components is easily formalized into a receptive safety rule that requires that behavior. Abadi and Lamport introduced the class of recept,ive safety properties as those safety properties that can only be violated by the controlled actions of a system. This distinguishes them from the nonreceptive properties whose violations are caused by environment,al event,s, possibly independent from the system behavior. The safety propert.ies whose violat,ions are caused by controlled events can be satisfied by modifying the system behavior to delay some events as long as their occurrence may violate the system safety. The enforceable nature makes receptive safet,y properties a. versatile mechanism for specifying desired g1oba.l system behavior. Another important characteristic of the receptive safety properties is their preservation under composition: Abadi and Lamport, proved that receptive safety properties satisfied by components or subsystems are also satisfied by the composed systems unless other component,s explicitly violate them.
Many sa.fety properties are nonreceptive because t,hey define safety viola.tions in terms of environment, event,s. Rea.l-t#ime properties are safety properties beca,use their violations are finitely verifia.ble. but, they are nonrecept,ive because time causes t8heir violations and t.ime is never a controlled part of the system. Receptive safety properties are very importa.nt for the implementation of reliable systems because the realizable part of any property is a. receptive property. The realizable part of a property i s defined as a t,opologica.lly closed set. of execut,ion traces that includes only t,ra.ces acceptable by that property [l]. This means t,liat. any syst,em t,hat sat.isfies a nonreceptive property has tmo sat,isfy a receptive safety propertmy. is not allowed to start rotating until the feed belt unloads a blank on it After the new blank is loaded on the rotating table, it is allowed to start rotating and the safety rule prohibits the feed belt from unloading another blank until the rotating table returns to the position in line with the belt.
FEED-TABLE
This safety rule describes a handshaking algorithm for the feed belt and the rotating table It requires a specific interleaving of transitions by the two components, insuring that the feed belt unloads the metal blank on the rotating table. Although the components are defined independently, this rule references both of them, enabling the integration process to modify their int,eraction by delaying one or the ot,her and allowing theni to complete the delayed transitions only when they preserve the safety
Delayed transition synchronization
The integration of concurrent systems based on safety rules requires the synchronization of individual components to restrict the possible interactions between them to a safe subset Synchronization in the manually designed systems uses a variety of mechanisms (semaphores, barriers, await statements etc) that work by delaying some actions until the conditions for proceeding are met.
The synchronifation mechanism in GenEx is based on the delaying of component transitions when they lead to a safety violation Delayed transitions can REQ Figure 5 : Delayed transition implementation be implemented by introducing one additional state where the FSM blocks unt,il the transition is safe to complete. Figure 5(b) illustrates the imlplementation of a delayed transition for the transition in Figure 5(a) . If the safety aiialysis finds that a transition could lead to a violation, a delayed version is added, blocking the component whenever the safety preconditions hold. The enabling condition of the original transition RE& is combined with a set of conditions E:RRCOND that is the precondition of the safety violation, and the resulting conditions enable the delayed transition. The original transition will be allowed to proceed only when its enabling condition REQ is sa.tir;fied and the safety violation precondition ERRCOND is not. The transition from the dehyed to the destination state will occur only when there is no potential for a safety violation. In practice we give higher priorities to the a.dded delayed transitions, and avoid having to compute the negation of synchronization conditions for the original transition.
System Integration
The integration process consists of several phases during which the components and safety rules are analyzed, modified and composed into art executable model. We will illustrate this process by showing how the safety-rule FEED-TABLE, shown in Figure 4 , is enforced by component synchronization. This safety rule references only the feed-belt and the rotating-table components, and thus only these components can lead to its violations. This allows us to limit the GenEx a.nalysis process to only those components, significantly reducing the overall a.nalysis complexity.
The first phase of the process is the analysis of component behavior with the goal of detecting potential violations of the safety rule and their preconditions. These precondit,ions are decomposed to produce the synchronization conditions for individual components. The only violations of the FEED- FEED-TABLE  FEED-BFLT, ROT-TABLE   ROBOT-TABLE  ROBOT, ROT-TABLE  ROBOT1-PRESS  ROBOT, PRESS  ROBOT2- Figure 6 . The delayed st,at,e BLANK-DELAk'is reachable when the safet.y rule F E E D -T A B L E is in the state F R E E or FEED-DONE, and the same synchronization conditions keep the component in the st,ate BLANIi_DELAI'. The original transition from B L A N K t,o UNLOADING is enabled only when both violat.ion precondit,ions a.re false, so this component can no longer cause safety violations. This transition ca.n be dehyed indefinitely because there are no timely execution requirements for its completion. The transitmion from M O V E to B L A N K has to remain free of dela.ys because it. ensures the time dependent requirement that the feed belt stops when an arriving blank rea.clies t,he sensor at the end of the belt. The user should design the safety rules for integration so they only restrict t,he delayable transitions of the component,s. The analysis and modificat,ion processes are repeat,ed for every safety rule and its referenced coinponents. resulting in a set of component,s with dela.yed tra.iisitions embled by the safety violation precondit,ions
Aft,er amlyzing all safety rules and adding delayed tra.nsitions to all components that need t,hem, the controller is int,egrat.ed by composing the components and t,he sa.fety monitors derived from t,he safety rules. The stat.es of all compoiient,s, arid safety rules. and the cont,rolled a.nd monitored variables are shared throughout the systeiii eimbling the runtime evaluation of synchronization conditions. The delayed tra.nsitions for a gix-en component a.nd various sa.fet,y rules are combined wit,hout, int,erference beca.use even if they apply t,o t,he same t,ransit,ioii, the delayed st,at8e for the tran-si6ion is unique. and t,lie t,raiisition can be completed only when it respects all safet,y rules. The safety mon-itors model the behavior of the safety rules used in the analysis, and provide the components with the information on their state needed to evaluate the enabling conditions for the delayed transitions. Some transitions that enforce real-time requirements 4 Complexity of the Analysis The product,ion cell system was classified in [SI as a medium complexity industrial system, with a total system space complexity estimated at fifty million states. This kind of complexity makes it infeasible to a.nalyze using exhaustive methods. Compositional and symbolic analysis methods may reduce the complexity but are nevertheless subject to the exponential complexity of the state space of the combined components. The partial system analysis in GenEx depends on the complexity of individual safety rules and the referenced components, ignoring the rest of the system with significant reduction in complexity. The composed system satisfies each safety rule individually, and preserves them in the composition. The safety rules are nonconflicting, so the integrated system satisfies deadlock freedom and liveness properties. Real-time requirements of the components are satisfied because the safety rules impose no restrictions on the transitions that enforce them.
The complexity of the safety analysis with respect to the individual safety rules is bounded by the product of the complexity of the safety rules and the referenced components. In the case of the F E E D -T A B L E rule, the bound on complexity is 160 states, and the actual complexity of the reachability graph is just under 100 sta.tes. The analysis of systems with this complexity is trivial for current verification tools [2] [SI.
The ta.ble in Figure 7 shows the size of the state spaces generated for the safety analysis with respect to individual safety rules. The table shows the components whose interaction is ana.lyzed and the number of states in the combined reachability graph. The complexity of the subsystem behaviors is trivial compared to the complexity of the total syst,em. The largest component of t,he system is the robot. and its interact,ions a.re obviously more complex then those of the other components. They a.re nevertheless well wit,hin t8he acceptable 1imit.s for analysis using our method.
Related and Future Research
This integration method produces synchronized systems based on independent system components. The resulting systems are comparable to systems based on stronger synchronization assumptions, such as those using labeled transition systems (LTS) [3] .
The strong synchronization assumptions in LTS lead to very elega.nt specifications and composition but complicate the implementation in distributed environments. The explicit, differentiation in GenEx between safety rules and components ma.kes it easier to define rules that guhrantee correct composition without global behavior analysis.
The safety rules that we use to synchronize components have two rdles: 1) they define the partial order interpretation of system behavior, and 2) relate them to the unacceptable behaviors. The partial order interpretation has home similarities with the approach in Rapide [6], where component actions are explicitly triggered by mat!ching system behaviors with predefined partial orders. While the triggered act,ions are specified by the user in Rapide, GenEx derives these actions from the: necessity of preserving the system safet,y. The specification of unacceptable behaviors is the main role of the safety rules in GenEx, because we use the safety violations preconditions to derive the triggering conditions for the safety preserving actions. The synchronization of systems based on desired temporal properties is theoretically discussed in [4] , and preservation of safety properties in composed systems in [I].
One of our goals is to extend GenEx to accommodate larger subsystems then the ones in the production cell example. We have a prototype of a static safety analysis algorithh that will produce synchronization conditions withoqt generating even a subsystem reach-abi1it.y gra.ph. Instead of analyzing the full behavior, we analyze only the transitions that have the potent,ial to violate thb safety rules. This approach computes synchroniz4tion conditions to prevent all possible safety violations, regardless of their reachability, but has the poterkial to dramatically reduce the complexity of the analysis. In case of the FEED-TABLE safety rule the cbmplexity of static analysis is four states corresponcQng to the four violation transitions in the safet,y rule. Similar complexity would apply to all other safety rdles in the production cell system.
Another futurp topic for this system is a set of guidelines for the^ construction of composable component,s and safety ~ rules. In general, the components should determinei their future behavior based on their own st,at,e and monitored signals, and the safety rules specify when tha$ behavior is acceptable. Our const,ruction of the production cell controller illustrates one simple way tp decompose systems for automated synchronization using GenEx. The components decide what their next action is, and the safety rules specify when thal action becomes acceptable. Compoiieiit,s also satisfy some real-time requirements and the safety rules ar~e constructed in a way that preserves t8hem: t,he compbnent act.ions that satisfy t,he realt,ime requirements are never rejected by any safety rule. and thus alle never delayed. Other simple de-sign patterns can be used to guarantee that the safety rules and components can never become deadlocked due to the introduced delays.
Conclusion
The synchronized production cell shows how reliable and safe systems can be integrated automatically using safety rules. Our implementation of a production cell system is composed of simple reusable components, and explicit safety rules that integrate their behavior. This design produces a safe executable system that successfully controls the production cell and sat,isfies its safety requirements. Even the real-time requirements of the system are preserved in the integrated system despite the synchronization using delayed transitions. These results show that, GenEx has the necessary capabilities to be a useful tool for high assurance system development.
